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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
not have expressly stipulated to that effect? It is possible that
the question was left open because none of the classifications
of' ownership would adequately describe the nature of the wife's
interest in the community. It is submitted that fewer unde-
sirable results will be produced if the wife's interest is char-
acterized as the lawmakers intended it to be - sui generis.
Gordon E. Rountree
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS BY SPOUSES
During the existence of the marital community, two broad
classes of actions may arise with accompanying problems pecu-
liar to each: actions against third parties and those between the
spouses themselves. The former may be further divided into
actions which may be brought by the wife in her individual ca-
pacity and actions properly instituted by the husband individ-
ually, or as head and master of the community. In the past dif-
ficulty has arisen due to uncertainty whether certain actions
are separate or community, since choice of an improper plain-
tiff could result in dismissal for no right of action. In the area
of the wife's separate actions there has been a significant broad-
ening of the wife's capacity to sue as well as an increase in the
number of claims classified as her separate property. In the
area of interspousal suits, most problems are concerned with
the scope of the underlying policy prohibiting certain types of
suits, especially tort suits, and the breadth of the prohibition
itself. This Comment examines these problem areas.
ACTIONS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
Wife's Separate Rights and Actions
Generally, the classification of the right sought to be en-
forced as one belonging to the community or to the separate
estate of one spouse determines the choice of a proper plaintiff.
Actions to enforce common rights usually must be instituted by
the husband as head and master of the community, whereas
each spouse may institute actions relative to his own separate
property. The husband's separate rights and actions apparently
do not present any problems, since he may personally institute
(Vol. XXV
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judicial proceedings to enforce his separate rights; in the event
the claims are classified as community, he may prosecute them
as head and master of the community.'
Before emancipatory legislation, married women in Louisi-
ana were burdened with certain legal incapacities2 directly
traceable to the Code Napoleon. 3 At Roman law, the wife suf-
fered no such general incapacities, her only limitation being
lack of capacity to bind herself for her husband's benefit.4 The
most onerous disability in Louisiana was that the wife could not
perform juridical acts or appear in court without her husband's
authorization 5 unless she were legally separated. 6 If the hus-
band were interdicted, absent, or had refused to give his con-
sent, authorization could be obtained from the court.7  Relaxa-
tion of the restrictions on the wife's capacity began in 1902
1. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 686 (1960).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 120, 121, 122, 2446 (1870).
3. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 214: "La femme est obligde d'habiter avec to mari,
et de La suivre par-tout o4 it juge d propos de rdsider: le mari est obligd de la
reeovoir, et de lui fournir tout ce qui est ndcessaire pour les besoins de la tie,
solon ses facultds et son dtat." LA. C-iL CODE art. 120 (1870) is merely a trans-
lation of the French code article.
FRENCH CIVrIL CODE art. 215 is essentially the same as LA. CIVIL CODE art.
121 (1870), and reads: "La femcma ne pent ester en jugement sans 'autorisation
de son mari, quand meme elle serait marchande publique, ou non commune, ou
sdparde do biens."
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 217 is the counterpart of ILA. CIvIL CODE art. 122
(1870) : "La femie, memo non commune ou sdparde do biens, ne pout donner,
alidner, hypothdquer, acqu6rir, 4 titre gratuit ou ongroux, sans le concours d*
mars dang 'acte, ou son consentement par 4crit."
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1595 is essentially the same as LA. CIVIL CODE art.
2446 (1870) : "Le oontrat de vente no paut avoir lieu entre 6poum quo dans len
trois cas suivants:
"1. Celui o4 L'un des deux 6poum cede des biens 4 r'autre, sdpar6 judiciaire-
ment d'aveo lui, en paiemant de ses droits;
"2. Celui oia la cession qua lo mar fait d sa femme, mWme non sdparde, a une
cause idgitime, talle que le remploi de sos immeubles alidnds, ou de deniers 4 ele
appartenant, si c0s immeubles ou deniers no tombent pas en communautd;
"S. Celui o" la femme cde des biens d son mari en paiement d'une somnme
qu'elle lui aurait promise en dot, et lorsqu'iL V a exclusion de communautd;
"Sauf, dans ces trois cas, las droits des hdritiers des parties contractantes, s'il
y a avantage indirect."
4. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ItLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS 632-
33 (7th ed. 1931).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 121, 122 (1870) ; La. Code of Practice art. 106
(1870). The authorization necessary could be either express or implied. See,
e.g., Ireland v. Bryan, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 515 (La. 1825) ; Rowel v. Buhler, 3 Mart.
(N.S.) 348 (La. 1825).
Joinder in suit as authorization: Chiasson v. Duplantier, 10 La. 570 (1837)
Lawes v. Chinn, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 388 (La. 1826). When both spouses were cited
and the wife alone appeared, the husband's authorization was presumed, Twichell
v. Buell, 13 Orl. App. 121 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1916). For a detailed discussion
of the married woman's incapacities, see Comment, 8 TUL. L. REV. 106 (1933).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 123 (1870).
7. Id. arts.:132, and,124; Blake v. Nelson, 29 La. Ann. 245 (1877).
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when Civil Code article 2402 was amended to provide that dam-
agesi for the wife's personal injuries were her separate prop-
erty and "recoverable by herself alone."8 The amended article
was interpreted to allow the wife to bring her separate personal
injury suits without the usual authorization.9 Most restrictions
h'i the wife's contractual and procedural capacities were re-
moved by a series of "emancipatory acts" between 1916 and
1930.10 Procedurally, the most important is the first of these
acts, in 1916, which gave the wife capacity to sue and be sued
iii respect of her separate and paraphernal property, as if shewere femme sole."' In this and each later emancipatory act, a
saving clause provided that the acts were not intended to modify
or affect the laws relating to community property. 12 Although
this clause prevented intrusion upon the husband's position as
head and master of the community, 18 the broadening of the
wife's procedural capacity did indirectly affect the community
property system, even if only in matters of procedure, and the
present law thus does not require that the wife be authorized
by her husband to sue for rights which are solely her own.
The wife's separate rights against third parties generally
include tort claims for her personal injuries 14 as well as dam-
ages to her separate property,15 real actions in relation to her
separate immovable property,'6 and enforcement of certain con-
tractual rights where the proceeds inure to her separate estate.17
Concurrently, the wife may sue in her own name to enforce some
special rights conferred upon her by the legislature even though
the proceeds may fall into the community.'8
Article 2351 of the Civil Code provides that the wife, after
'8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870), as amended.
9. Shield v. F. Johnson &,Son Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913).
10. La. Acts 1916, No. 94; La. Acts 1918, No. 244; La. Acts 1920, No. 219;
La. Acts 1926, No. 132'; La. Acts 1928, No. 283. These provisions are now in-
corporated in LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
11. La. Acts 1916, No. 94, now incorporated in LA. R.S. 9:101-05 (1950).
:12. LA. R.S. 9:105 (1950) : "Nothing contained in R.S. 9:101, 9:102, and
9:103 is intended to modify or affect the laws relating to the matrimonial com-
in6nity of'acquits and gains or the laws prescribing what is deemed the separate
property of the spouses." The substance of this provision is found in La. Acts
•1916; No. 94, § 1; La. Acts 1918, No. 244, § 1; La. Acts 1920, No. 219,§ 1; La.
Acts 1926, No. 132, § 4; La. Acts 1928, No. 283, § 5.
13. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
:_14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
15. Id. arts. 2334, 2386, 2404.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); State
ex ref. Kennington 'v. School Board, 193 So. 225 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).,
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court authorization, may sue for her dotal effects in the event
her: husband is absent or neglects to :sue for them. 19 The neces-
sity of authorization should have been removed by the emanci-
patory acts notwithstanding the saving clause, since the author-
ization was required merely to give the wife capacity and seems
not to be a substantive rule of community property. Even be-
fore the emancipatory acts there seemed to be no doubt of the
wife's capacity to institute suit under article 2363 in the event
the dotal estate was alienated, since the action may arise only
after a dissolution of the marriage or separation of property.2
6
Perplexing questions concerning the classification of rights
have arisen in a variety of situations, often resulting in the
choice of an improper plaintiff and successful exception of no
right of action. The action has been considered personal to the
wife when undertaken for the following purposes: to recover
profits from real estate ventures involving her separate im-
movable property when she had no active separate business as
such ;21 to recover damages for mental anguish suffered by de-
privation of the use of community furniture ;22 to obtain dam-
ages for humiliation occasioned by unlawful acts against the
community real estate ;2.3 to recover furniture inherited by the
wife ;24 to recover workmen's compensation benefits ;25 to re-
cover benefits of a health and accident policy;26 to enforce pay-
ment of a negotiable instrument when the wife is designated as
payee, even though the funds recovered would fall into the com-
munity;27 and to be reinstated to a teacher's position, :even
though there is an ancillary claim for accrued salary.
28
The Code of Civil Procedure offers a solution to the pro-
cedural problem confronting the spouses when an action of
doubtful classification arises. Article 686 provides for use, of
19. LA. CIVIL Cow& art. 2351 (1870).
20. Id. art. 2363.
21. Byrd v. Babin, 181 La. 466, 159 So. 718 (1935).
22. Rogers v. Burglass, 171 So. 106 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
23. Cutrer v. Spring, 4 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
.24.: 'Pachi v. White, 54 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
25. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
26. Bain v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 188 La. 290, 176 So. 129 (1937)..:
27. Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). The court
declared that LA. R.S. 7:51 (1950) permitted a holder of a negotiable, instru-
ment to sue thereon in his own name. The court emphasized the fact that de-
fendant did not contend he was deprived of any rights or defenses by the failure
of the husband to bring the suit.
28. State*ez rel. Kennington v. School Board, 193 So. 225 (La. App. 2d Cir.1 9 3 9 ) . ., .... . ., : . . . . . : . . :: " , -, : '; , ,
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alternative pleading, allowing both spouses to sue in the alterna-
tive, and in the event the right sought to be enforced is declared
personal to either, the other may proceed as proper plaintiff.29
Enforcement of Separate Rights Through Other Spouse
as Agent
The husband is improper plaintiff if the recovery would be
his wife's separate property,80 and presumably the wife is im-
proper plaintiff if the recovery would be her husband's separate
property. If one spouse makes the other his agent to assert a
separate action, then the agent is apparently a proper plaintiff.
Although no reported case illustrates the use of such procedure,
it is believed that it was possible even before adoption of the
Code of Civil Procedure.31  Since adoption of the new Code, the
procedure unquestionably is Valid under articles 694 and 695.32
29. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 686 (1960): "The husband is the
proper plaintiff, during the existence of the marital community, to sue to en-
force a right of the community.
"Where doubt exists whether the right sought to be enforced belongs to the
marital community or to the separate estate of the wife, the husband and wife
may sue in the alternative to enforce the right."
In official comment ('b) to article 686, it is said: "One of the greatest re-
proaches to the administration of civil justice in Louisiana has been the manner
in which our courts have permitted defendants to invoke substantive rules of
community property to defeat the enforcement of the rights of husband and
wife ...
"The substantive rules of community property are legal rules of accounting
between the community and separate estates which usually are of no concern to
the defendant. The only justification for procedural rules on the subject are:
(1) a recognition of the husband as head and master of the community to pre-
vent any unauthorized assertion by the wife of a community right; (2) pro-
tection of the rights of the forced heirs and creditors of the husband; and (3)
protection of a defendant against double recovery. Time and time again the
courts have permitted a defendant, completely protected against double recovery,
to defeat a wife's suit when the evidence technically showed that the right sought
to be enforced by the wife, with the husband's approval, was a community
right; or when the evidence failed to rebut the presumption that it was a com-
munity right.
"The alternative pleading sanctioned by the second paragraph of this article
affords an effective solution of the problems in this area."
Obviously, if the right asserted is classified as the husband's separate right,
he may proceed as proper plaintiff.
30. Martin v. Ethyl Corp., 218 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. La. 1963). Here the
court, relying on Grandjean v. New Orleans Gas Light Co., Orl. No. 8225,
Tessier's Digest (La. App. Or. Cir. 1922), held the husband was prohibited from
recovering damages to the wife which would not fall into the community when
there was no evidence of some agency relationship.
31. Contrary to the rule at common law, in Louisiana the agent for a dis-
closed principal may sue to enforce the rights of the latter. See, e.g., Pearson
v. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry., 226 La. 834, 77 So. 2d 411 (1954) ; Reisz v.
Kansas City So. R.R., 148 La. 929, 88 So. 120 (1921) ; Casanas v. Audubon
Hotel Co., 124 La. 786, 50 So. 714 (1909) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1787 (1870).
32. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 694 (1960), in part: "An agent has
the procedural capacity to sue to enforce a right of his principal, when specially
COMMENTS
Community Rights and Actions
Historically, in community property jurisdictions the hus-
band alone, as head and master of the community, has been en-
titled to prosecute claims which belong to the community.3 3 This
principle was adopted in Louisiana through the broad grant of
power to the husband as head and master of the community
under article 2404.34 The wife was thus incapable of prosecut-
ing a community claim in her own name, even if she sued under
the honest misapprehension that the claim was her separate
property and the husband had authorized her to enforce it in
her individual capacity.3 5 In some cases the courts implied that
the wife would not be allowed to prosecute a community claim
on behalf of the community as agent. 36 These limitations on the
wife's capacity to sue, coupled with the frequent difficulty in
distinguishing her separate claims from those of the community,
created two problems in enforcement of community claims.
First, if the right sought to be enforced is one of questionable
classification and the identity of the plaintiff will determine
whether the action will be met by successful exception of no
right of action, which of the spouses should prosecute the claim?
Second, if the husband wishes to allow his wife to sue to en-
force a community claim, how can he do so, if at all? Since the
married women's emancipation acts were held not to relieve the
wife's inability to enforce community claims,3 7 these problems
remained until the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in
1960. The issues involved can be brought into sharper focus
by an examination of specific examples from the jurisprudence.
Problems of Classification and Choice of Plaintiff
In numerous cases the wife, suing to enforce a right appar-
authorized to do so."
Id. art. 695, in part: "A wife, as the agent of her husband, may sue to en-
force a right of his separate estate ...when specially authorized to do so by her
husband."
33. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 66 (1943).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co.,
157 La. 383, 102 So. 497 (1924); Munch v. Central Laundry Co., 2 La. App.
123 (Orl. Cir. 1925).
35. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
36. See, e.g., ibid.; Hellberg v. Hyland, 168 La. 493, 122 So. 593 (1929)
Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co., 157 La. 383, 102 So. 497 (1924) ; Lanza v. DeRidder
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
37. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950). *See, e.g., Hellberg v. Hyland, 168 La. 493,
122 So. 593 (1929) ; Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co., 157 La. 383, 102 So. 497 (1924);
Harris v. Travelers Indem. Co., 70 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Delpido
v. Colony, 52 So. 2d 720 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Lanza v. DeRidder Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
1964]
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ently thought by both the spouses and their legal counsel to be-
long to the wife's separate estate, was defeated by a successful
exception of no right of action, predicated on the finding that
the claim was community property and thus enforceable only
by the husband. This harsh result occurred, for example, when
the wife attempted to recover the following: earnings while she
was living with her husband ;38 delictual damages to community
property acquired in the wife's name ;39 salary and profits, ex-
cept in actions under the Teachers' Tenure Law ;40 and medical
expenses and loss of earnings resulting from personal injury.
41
Even if the wife were a public merchant, 42 apparently she would
not have the capacity to sue for the income of her separate trade
unless this income was declared her separate property, a mat-
ter of uncertainty in the complexity of the substantive rules of
community property.43 There seem to be only two exceptions to
the rule barring the wife from prosecuting a community claim
in her own name: (1) if the wife is designated as the payee in
38. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933); Houghton v. Hall,
177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
39. Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co., 157 La. 383, 102 So. 497 (1924); Jackson v.
Firemen's Ins. Co., 86 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Cutrer v. Spring,
4 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
40. 'Mitchell v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 231 La. 546, 91 So. 2d 788 (1956)
Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933) ; Succession of Howell, 177
La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933). But cf. Youngblood v. Daily & Weekly Signal
Tribune, 131 So. 604, 606 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930), in which two wives, as
plaintiffs, were awarded compensation for their services, expenses, and time,
though they had not been authorized by their husbands to sue. The court said:
"As to whether the amounts collected through these suits, if any, would be
community assets under the circumstances disclosed, we express no opinion.
But conceding they would be community assets, defendant could suffer no injury
by reason of the fact that plaintiffs were not specifically authorized by their
husbands to bring the suits .... [W]e think a judgment rendered against de-
fendant in these suits would be res adjudicata and fully protect the defendant."
In State ex rel. Fields v. School Board, 227 La. 290, 297, 79 So. 2d 312, 314
(1955), the wife was allowed to sue for reinstatement and back pay on the theory
that "the right of a permanent teacher to the protection afforded by the provi-
sions of the Teachers' Tenure Act is a personal one which cannot be asserted
by anyone else in his or her behalf, not even on the hypothesis that it belongs
to the conjugal partnership where the teacher is a married woman." The court
regarded as unsound the decision in Riche v. School Board, 200 So. 681 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1941), in which a married woman was not allowed to sue under
the Teachers' Tenure Act for her back salary alone. The court said the Riche
decision "fails to take into account that the Teachers' Tenure Act is a special
law and that, therefore, the rights vouchsafed thereunder are strictly personal
and cannot be governed by the general laws." Id. at 298, 79 So. 2d at 315.
41. Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 17 So 2d 506 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1944)
Simon v. Harrison, 200 So. 476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
42. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 131 (1870).
43. See, e.g., Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933) ; Succession
of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933). In King v. Dearman, 105 So. 2d 293,
297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958), the court said: "[T]he wife's earnings from sep-
arate trade or business fall within the community if she is living with her hus-
band at the time said business is carried on."
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a negotiable instrument in her possession, she may sue to en-
force paymenteven though the funds recovered would fall into
the community ;44 (2) if the wife sues under the Teachers' Ten-
ure Law for reinstatement she may prosecute an ancillary claim
for earnings. 4 5 These special concessions perhaps resulted from
the courts' realization of the inequity in allowing the substan-
tive rule of community property law to defeat an otherwise
legitimate cause of action in circumstances where the defendant
was not prejudiced by threat of double recovery or loss of rights
or defenses.
The Code of Civil Procedure effectively eliminated the diffi-
culties discussed above, through the simple expedient of alter-
native pleading. Article 686 provides that "where doubt exists
whether the right sought to be enforced belongs to the marital
community or to the separate estate of the wife, the husband
and wife may sue in the alternative to enforce the right. ' 46
Thus if the right is classified as a community right the husband
will continue as plaintiff, while the wife stands in judgment if
the claim is attributed to her separate estate. The only justifi-
cations for the former procedural rules were to prevent usurpa-
tion of the husband's powers as head and master of the commu-
nity by the wife, to protect rights of the husband's forced heirs
and creditors, and to protect the defendant from the danger of
double recovery.4 7 Obviously, these ends are achieved by use of
alternative pleading, since ultimately the proper plaintiff will
stand in judgment.
Enforcement of Community Claim by Wife under Husband's
Authorization
In Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co. 48 the wife, when confronted with
an exception of no right of action based on the theory that she
was procedurally incapable of asserting a community claim,
contended that she had been authorized by her husband to prose-
cute the community claim as an agent of the community. 49 The
court sustained the exception on the basis that article 2404 al-
lows only the husband to sue for community claims. In Succes-
44. See note 27 supra.
45. See note 40 8upra.
46. See note 29 supra.
47. See note 29 supra.
48. 157 La. 383, 102 So. 497 (1924).
49. Id. at 385, 102 So. at 498.
1964] !: i
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szon of Howell ° a deceptively similar result was reached when
the husband authorized the wife's suit in her own name to re-
cover earnings they both believed to be her separate property.51
Although the court in Howell relied heavily on Mitchell,
52 it is
important to distinguish the two cases. In Mitchell, the wife
contended she was suing as agent for the community53 while in
Howell the wife was prosecuting in her own name. 54 The de-
cision in the Howell case, however, implies that the rule of
Mitchell is the result intended.55 Act 49 of 1944, amending ar-
ticle 1787 of the Civil Code to allow the wife to "act as manda-
tary for her husband or for the community when authorized by
her husband," 56 was seemingly directed at the results of the
Mitchell and Howell cases. In the opinion of at least one writer,
the 1944 amendment permitted the wife to institute judicial
proceedings for the community upon proper authorization by
her husband. 7 The courts, however, have been most reluctant
to accept such an interpretation, preferring to allow only the
husband to prosecute claims for the community. In the few
instances where the wife was allowed to prosecute a claim on
behalf of the community, amended article 1787 was not men-
tioned.59
50. 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
51. Id. at 279, 148 So. at 49.
52. Id. at 281, 148 So. at 50.
53. Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co., 157 La. 383, 385, 102 So. 497, 498 (1924).
54. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 279, 148 So. 48, 49 (1933).
55. Id. at 281, 148 So. at 50: "In the case of Mitchell v. Dixie Ice Co ...
the court said: "In suits for damages for injuries suffered by the community,
this court has never held that the mere assent of the husband is sufficient, or
that the wife alone can judicially vindicate the rights of the community. There
is a uniform and unbroken line of decisions to the contrary, all holding that in
suits of this character the wife is not competent to stand in judgment, and that
the suit must be brought in the name of the husband.'"
56. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1787 (1870), as amended: "A married woman may
act as mandatary, and her acts will bind the mandator and the person with
whom she contracts, although she be not authorized by her husband; she may
also act as mandatary for her husband or for the community when authorized by
her husband."
57. Oppenheim, The Significance of Recent Louisiana Legislation Concerning
the Marital Community -Louisiana Acts 49 and 286 of 1944, 19 TUL. L. REV.
200 (1944).
58. See Rollins v. Beaumont-Port Arthur Bus Lines, 88 F. Supp. 908
(W.D. La. 1950) ; Hollingquest v. Kansas City Ry., 88 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La.
1950) ; Williams v. Cormier, 100 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Reid v.
Monticello, 33 So. 2d 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
59. Grantz v. Levy, 170 La. 712, 129 So. 139 (1930) (negotiable instrument
exception) ; Lavoy v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 159 La. 209, 105 So. 292
(1925) (defendant failed to file exception; court allowed wife to sue for com-
munity claim) ; Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961)
(negotiable instruments exception) ; Anderson v. Simmons, 75 So. 2d 34 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1954) (husband not party to wife's suit; consented on witness
stand that judgment for community loss be rendered in her favor; held that he
1964] COMMENTS
Article 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly allows the
procedure attempted in Mitchell, that is, the wife may sue as
agent of the community under special mandate from her hus-
band ;60 but with the fact situation of Howell, it is submitted
that the article should not apply. The husband's authorization
should specifically appoint his wife as agent to sue for the com-
munity, not merely authorize her to proceed in her own name.61
INTERSPOUSAL ACTIONS
This section considers the wife's protective actions against
the husband, the scope and underlying policy of Louisiana's
interspousal tort immunity, and the circumvention of this im-
munity through the direct action statute.
Wife v. Husband
Protective Actions
The wife's protective actions within the community serve to
protect her dotal and paraphernal property, as well as her in-
terest in the family home and the community property against
her husband's mismanagement. Procedurally, these actions
present little difficulty and, since the emancipatory acts,6 2 the
wife no longer needs court authorization to sue. She may sue
for restitution of her paraphernal property at any time when
the husband administers it.63 The wife's action for separation
constituted wife his agent without mentioning article 1787); State ex rel.
Kennington v. School Board, 193 So. 225 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (Teachers'
Tenure Law exception).
60. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 695 (1960): "A wife, as the agent
of her husband, may sue to enforce a right of his separate estate, or a right of
the marital community, when specially authorized to do so by her husband." In
the official comment it is said: "This article employs express language to ac-
complish what was sought to be accomplished in the source provision [LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1787]. The source of this article expressly authorized the wife to sue
as the agent of her husband. It does not spell out the right of the wife to sue
as agent to enforce a community right, and hence does not completely remove
all doubt thereof .... This article completely spells out the procedural capacity
of the wife to sue as agent to enforce a community right, when authorized to do
so by the husband."
61. In the first case interpreting the article, Muse v. United States Cas. Co.,
306 F. 2d 30, 31 (5th Cir. 1962), the court said: "It [article 695] merely au-
thorized a procedural step in that the wife may sue as agent for the husband
who otherwise would be the only person entitled to sue on behalf of the com-
munity."
62. Now incorporated in LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
63. LA CIVIL CODE arts. 2388, 2390, 2391 (1870). See, e.g., Slater v. Cul-
pepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1958); Carter v. Third Dist. Homestead
Ass'n, 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230 (1940) ; Guss v. Mathews, 179 La. 1033, 155
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of property need not be predicated on danger to her dowry as
the Civil Code seems to suggest.6 4 When the wife has a legal
mortgage on the property of her husband, her capacity to en-
force it is unquestioned.65 Article 2404,'6 as interpreted by the
jurisprudence, provides the wife further means to protect her
interest in the community by suit to recover half of any com-
munity property alienated by the husband in fraud of her
rights.6 7  Since this action arises upon the dissolution of the
community only, unquestionably the wife has capacity to assert
the cause of action. The wife may also protect her interest in
the family residence by filing a designation and declaration of
"family home" in the conveyance records of the parish in which
it is located.68 In the event the home is sold thereafter without
her consent, she may take appropriate judicial action against
all parties.6 9
So. 765 (1934); Bouligny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209 (1861).
64. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2366, 2425 (1870). See, e.g., Gastauer v. Gastauer,
131 La. 1, 58 So. 1012 (1912); Chaffe v. Watts, 37 La. Ann. 324 (1885);
Vickers v. Block, 31 La. Ann. 672 (1879) ; Mock v. Kennedy, 11 La. Ann. 525
(1856) ; Childers v. Johnson, 6 La. Ann. 634 (1851) ; Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob.
342 (La. 1844).
65. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2376, 3319 (1870). See, e.g., Fastin v. Eastin's
Heirs, 10 La. 194 (1836) ; Cable v. Bossier, 4 La. 558 (1832) ; Nadaud v.
Mitchell, 6 Mart.(O.S.) 688 (La. 1819) ; Cassou v. Blanque, 3 Mart.(O.S.) 390
(La. 1814) ; Butcher v. Butcher, 83 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
66. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870), in part: "But if it should be proved
that the husband has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the
same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her action against the heirs of
her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of the property, on her satis-
factorily proving the fraud."
67. In Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 946, 120 So. 2d 485, 487 (1960), where
the wife could not set aside her husband's dation en paiement and transfer of
common immovable property since there had been no dissolution of the com-
munity, it was said: "[W]hile the jurisprudence is settled that the wife's half
interest in the community property is not a mere expectancy during the marriage
nor transmitted to her inconsequence (sic) of a dissolution of the community,
but that title thereto is vested in the wife from the moment it is acquired by
the community or by the spouses jointly, nevertheless her interest is subject to
the husband's management and control as long as the marital community re-
mains undissolved . . . by dissolution of the marriage itself through death, divorce
or annulment; and during the marriage, by the wife's action for separation of
property, by a judgment of separation from bed and board obtained by either
spouse, or as the result of an action which either spouse may bring if the other
member of the community is an absentee."
The rule is clearly pronounced in Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 226, 91
So. 2d 12, 19 (1956), where it is said: "[Tlhe only logical view to be accorded
Article 2404 is that it gives to the defrauded wife an action against her husband
in the event the community is dissolved by divorce or judicial separation."
In an earlier case, Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951),
the divorced wife, alleging fraud in the donation of stock by the husband during
the marriage, was permitted to sue her ex-husband.
68. LA. R.S. 9:2801-2804 (1950).
69. In Smith v. Marino, 28 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947), the court
considered the third party purchaser in legal bad faith since he purchased the
family home after the wife's declaration was of record, thus enabling the wife to
COMMENTS
Tort Suits
R.S. 9:291 provides that "as long as the marriage con-
tinues and the spouses are not separated judicially a married
woman may not sue her husband except for:
"(1) A separation of property;
"(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal
property;




This statute prohibits the wife from bringing tort actions
against the husband, presumably on the theory that such suits
would disrupt domestic tranquility. In applying the statute the
courts have looked to the time of the judicial proceedings
rather than the time of the alleged offense in deciding whether
the wife's right of action is statutorily prohibited. 71 The rule
seems proper for two reasons: (1) under Louisiana jurispru-
dence it has been consistently held that the wife has a cause
of action against her husband in delict but she is merely barred
from enforcing it because of the matrimonial bond,7 2 thus the
existence of a marriage at the time of the suit is decisive; and
(2) if the underlying policy of the prohibition is to preserve
domestic tranquility during the marriage, the status of the par-
ties at the time of the suit should determine the applicability
of the statute.
In a recent decision, Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
become owner of one-half of the home in indivision with the third party pur-
chaser.
70. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950). This new statute, added by La. Acts 1960, No. 31,
is a transfer of article 105 of the Code of Practice (1870), with minor changes
unimportant for our consideration. Article 105 was derived from LAS SIETE
PARTIDAS pt. 3, tit. 5, L. 2 (1263).
71. In Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954), the
court permitted the newly divorced wife to sue her former husband for assault
and battery allegedly committed upon her by him during legal separation but
before absolute divorce. In a converse situation, the woman passenger's suit for
personal injuries against her host, although instituted a few days before their
marriage, could not be maintained after the marriage. Palmer v. Edwards, 156
So. 781 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
72. See, e.g., Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24
So. 2d 875 (1946) ; Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Edwards
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Vitale v. Checker
Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928) ; Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) ; Palmer v. Edwards, 156 So. 781 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934).
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Co.,73 defendant's third party demand for contribution against
his joint tortfeasor was denied on the theory that the latter,
plaintiff's husband, was not a solidary obligor because the wife
is prohibited from asserting her cause of action against him.
It is submitted that this is not the proper rule because the wife
possesses a substantive cause of action against her husband
(making him a solidary obligor), but she merely lacks the ca-
pacity to enforce this cause of action against him personally.
74
Defendant's third party demand could have been allowed for
the same reasons a liability insurer is not permitted to use the
personal defenses of the insured. 75 Although a subrogee gen-
erally has no greater rights than the subrogor,76 since the wife
has a substantive cause of action against the husband, it seems
that the subrogee should receive it free of the relative pro-
cedural incapacities of the wife.77 The wife's relative incapac-
ity to enforce her claim should not affect the defendant because
she does have a cause of action, and the husband should not be




Although R.S. 9:291 does not prohibit the husband from
suing the wife under various circumstances, it was once sug-
gested judicially that the prohibition was impliedly mutual.
79
This implication may have been supported by the common law
73. 164 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 167 So. 2d 672
(1964).
74. See note 72 supra.
75. See note 87 inIra.
76. See, e.g., Morgan v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 223 F. Supp. 996
(W.D. La. 1963) ; Great American Indem. Co. v. Laird, 73 So. 2d 6 (La App.
2d Cir. 1954) ; Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 52 So. 2d 311
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); International Paper Co. v. Arkansas & L.M. Ry.,
35, So. 2d 769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
77. Of. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
78. In Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 949, 162 So. 734, 738 (1935), the court,
in discussing Edwards v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935),
said: "The incapacity of the woman to prosecute the suit against Edwards [her
husband] was only a relative incapacity on her part . . . . [It] did not affect
the rights of the insurance company any more than it would have affected the
rights of the insurance company if Miss Palmer had merely refused to sue Ed-
wards, and had not married him..... The decision in Edwards v. Royal In-
demnity Co. merely recognized a distinction between a case where there is no
cause of action against the insured, and hence no cause of action against the
insurer, and a case where there is no right of action against the insured because
of a relative incapacity of the injured party to sue the insured . . . in which
case, according to Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., the injured party may have
a right of action against the insurance company alone, under the act of 1930."
79. Hawthorne v. Clarke, 39 La. Ann. 678, 679, 2 So. 561, 562 (1887).
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rule prohibiting tort suits between spouses on the theory that
no cause of action could arise between husband and wife be-
cause they were regarded as one entity.8° Today the rule in
Louisiana seems to allow the husband to sue his wife only if
denial of the right would result in a miscarriage of justice.81
The husband has been permitted to maintain the following ac-
tions: an application for a writ of habeas corpus directed tohis
wife ;82 a proceeding against the recorder of mortgages to force
the removal of an inscription from the records, where the wife
was a nominal party defendant ;53 a suit against the wife in her
representative capacity as executrix of the will of a third party
deceased ;84 and a suit for the restitution of the husband's separ-
ate property, or its value, wrongfully taken by the wife. s5 The
jurisprudential rule seems to have imposed no great hardship
on the husband, and as long as there is a tendency towards a
liberal construction of the rule, it seems proper.
Direct Action Statute
The direct action statute8 6 has allowed the spouse injured
through the other's fault to recover for his personal injuries by
barring an insurer from claiming the personal defenses of the
spouse tortfeasor8 7 A policy problem was presented in Mc-
80. See 27 AM. Jua. Husband and Wife § 589 (1940).
81. In Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 262, 3 So. 2d 609, 615-16 (1941)',
it is said: "While the foregoing authorities cannot be regarded as furnishing a
solution to the broad question (i.e., whether a husband should be permitted to
sue his wife in all cases), they do, at least, exhibit a tendency on the part of
this court to maintain such a suit where a denial of the right would result in. a
miscarriage of justice. . . . Moreover, the opinion of the court in State v. Dunn
is an adequate answer to the contention made by counsel for the defendants that
the husband is prohibited from suing his wife by Article 105 of the Code of
Practice [now R.S. 9:291]. That article, according to its plain provisions as
interpreted in the Dunn case, applies only to the wife's right to sue her husband
and forbids her to maintain an action against him except for the causes specified
therein."
82. State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel, 105 La. 741, 30 So. 122 (1901).
83. State ex rel. Macheca v. Dunn, 148 La. 460, 87 So. 236 (1921); Ber-
mudez v. Bermudez, 2 Mart.(O.S.) 180 (La. 1812).
84. Alexander v. Alexander, 12 La. Ann. 588 (1857).
85. See Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 31 So. 2d 609 (1941); Morrow,
Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 34 (1959) : "The
circumstances in this case were strong, and perhaps exceptional, since the hus-
band and wife were living separate and apart, and the wife in fact had con-
tracted a bigamous marriage."
86. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1963).
87. See, e.g., Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24
So. 2d 875 (1946) ; LeBlanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d
245 (1943) ; Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Edwards v. Royal
Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; Landrum v. United States Fid.&
Guar. Co., 151 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. (1963) ; Eddison v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 19.53) ; Chapman v. Travelers
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Henry v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,8 8 in which the husband
sued his negligent wife's insurer for damages. The policy ques-
tion was whether, since damages for the husband's personal in-
juries inured to the community,8 9 it was proper to award dam-
ages as they would incidentally benefit the negligent wife. The
court ruled in favor of the husband, reasoning that the recovery
would not be against public policy since the community would
not be "enriched" but only "reimbursed" for the loss it had sus-
tained as a result of the accident." The decision seems just, but
regardless of the court's reference to "reimbursed" rather than
"enriched," the community in which the negligent wife has a
half interest is indisputably enlarged by her husband's recov-
ery.91 A similar result was obtained when the husband-employee
was allowed to sue his wife-employer's insurer for workmen's
compensation claims even though the funds recovered would fall
into the community.92 Unless the injured spouse is also negli-
gent in some manner, no legal doctrine precludes his suing the
other's insurer for damages after the decision that the insurer
is not entitled to plead the personal defense of the spouse tort-
feasor.
Conclusion
The use of articles 686 and 695 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure eliminates the procedural problems concerning the proper
plaintiff where there is difficulty in classifying the right as
either separate or community, and allows the wife to act as
agent for her husband to prosecute claims belonging to the com-
munity. The articles were enacted for the purpose of eliminat-
Indem. Co., 45 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
88. 206 La. 70, 18 So. 2d 656 (1944).
89. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
90. McHenry v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So. 2d 656
(1944).
91. The first case in which the Mcileary decision was interpreted was Levy
v. New Orleans & N.E. Ry., 21 So. 2d 155 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945). There the
court limited the McHenry rule to cases in which the wife was not driving a
community-owned car on a community mission. (In McHenry the wife was
driving during the course of her employment.) Later decisions, however, have
allowed the liberal use of the McHenry rule without mentioning Levy. See, e.g.,
Dowden v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963); McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1953).
92. MeLain v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 28 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1946). The court based its decision to allow the husband's action on a theory
of estoppel - the insurance company was estopped from pleading that no recovery
could be had since it would fall into the community because the insurance com-




ing inequities whereby a person could avoid liability in the suit
by simply urging a provision of law designed to govern behavior
between husband and wife only. To minimize the disruption of
domestic tranquility, the procedural obstacle to tort suits should




Any system that combines a community estate and separate
estates for each spouse presupposes a distribution of liabilities
among them. Such a system obviously requires judicial caution
to prevent dishonest persons from defrauding creditors by
astute allocations of assets and liabilities among the community
and separate estates of the spouses.' Thus it is necessary to
distinguish between community debts and the separate debts of
either spouse, to determine which property is liable for what
debts, and to establish rules of priority between community and
separate creditors. Two terse code articles,2 apparently Span-
ish in origin, 3 are the only significant legislative provisions on
community liability to third persons. 4 Lacking more detailed
legislative guidance, 5 the courts have been compelled to dispose
of cases on an ad hoc basis. The results are not always consis-
tent, and some have been severely condemned as contrary to
basic principles of community property.6 Since 1920 consid-
1. For a doubtful case, see Thomas v. Vega, 185 La. 386, 169 So. 443 (1936).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2403 (1870) : "In the same manner, the debts con-
tracted during the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains,
and must be acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband
and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their personal and
individual effects."
Id. art. 2409: "It is understood that, in the partition of the effects of the
partnership or community of gains, both husband and wife are to be equally
liable for their share of the debts contracted during the marriage, and not ac-
quitted at the time of its dissolution."
3. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3,
8 (1959). FUERO REAL bk. 3, tit. 20, L. 114 (1255) may be the ultimate source
of the concluding portion of art. 2403.
4. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 131 (1870), apparently copied from FRENCH
CIVIL CODE art. 220 (1804).
5. Compare the more comprehensive dispositions of SPANISH CIVIL CODE arts.
1408-1411 (1889) and FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1409-1420 (1804) with LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 2403, 2409 (1870).
6. 1DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 438-39, 456-57 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAI]. It may be doubted that there are "general
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